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1 Abstract
The purpose of this master’s project is to study different probabilistic cryptography
schemes. The older probabilistic schemes, Goldwasser-Micali and Blum-Goldwasser, will
only be covered briefly for a historical perspective. Several new and promising schemes
have appeared in the last 7 years, generating interest. I will be examining the Paillier
and Damg˚ard-Jurik schemes in depth. This report explains the mathematics behind the
schemes along with their inherent benefits, while also suggesting some potential uses.
Details are given on how I optimized the algorithms, with special emphasis on using the
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) in the Damg˚ard-Jurik algorithm as well as the other
algorithms. One of the main benefits these schemes posses is the additively homomorphic
property. I explain the homomorphic properties in the description of the schemes and
give an overview of these properties in Appendix A.
I create software based in the Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) that is used to do
a comparative study. This includes a simple message passing program for encrypted text.
I create my own implementations of Paillier, Damg˚ard-Jurik, and a variation of Paillier’s
scheme as a Provider using the JCE. These implementations use the CRT along with other
methods to increase performance and create optimized algorithms. The implementations
are plugged into the message passing program with an implementation of RSA from
another Provider. A comparative study of the timings of these three schemes is done to
show which one performs better in different circumstances. Conclusions are drawn based
on the results of the tests and my final opinions are stated.
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3 Overview of Probabilistic Cryptography
The first thing that should be understood about probabilistic encryption is what makes it
unique from other types of public key cryptography. Many of the schemes that are more
familiar, like RSA, are deterministic. This means that for a fixed public key the same
plaintext will always be encrypted to the same ciphertext. This characteristic can cause
some security concerns. One concern is that it is easy to see if the same message is sent
more than once. This could be very revealing in a voting protocol when there are only
two responses, yes or no. Deterministic schemes also have problems encrypting a certain
subset of the message space. This is the case in RSA where 0 and 1 are always encrypted
to themselves.
Probabilistic schemes avoid the problems mentioned above because they use a random
number every time a message is encrypted. Assuming the number is truly random, each
time a particular message m is encrypted the ciphertext will change and be indistinguish-
able from the last ciphertext. Probabilistic encryption is a very strong encryption that is
both polynomially and semantically secure. It should also be noted that any deterministic
scheme could be altered to be probabilistic by adding a random number in the encryption
and decryption [10].
It was pointed out to me that several other modern schemes could also be considered
probabilistic, but I have hardly found any source mention this. Both the ElGamal and
Elliptic Curve schemes have the same probabilistic characteristics mentioned above. So
why don’t they bear the “probabilistic” nameplate? This is most likely due to the lineage
they evolved from. It seems that many probabilistic schemes evolved from the origi-
nal Goldwasser-Micali scheme, which first defined the idea of probabilistic cryptography.
These schemes are all based on finding the discrete log with very high residuosity classes.
In [14], the author mentions how these probabilistic schemes evolved from Goldwasser-
Micali in varying degrees: Benaloh’s scheme [3], Naccache and Stern scheme [11], Okamoto
and Uchiyama scheme [12], Paillier’s scheme which I discuss, and Damg˚ard-Jurik’s system
[7] which I also discuss. Schemes not possessing this lineage don’t have this distinction
but may still have the necessary characteristics. When looking for probabilistic charac-
teristics, keep in mind they may be found in schemes not labeled as such or by altering a
deterministic scheme to be probabilistic.
At the beginning of my research into probabilistic cryptography, my assumption was
that most of my work would be on the Goldwasser-Micali and Blum-Goldwasser schemes.
As I dug deeper, I realized that there were very few references to them in two decades
since their creation. It didn’t surprise me in the case of Goldwasser-Micali because of
how slow it is and its simplistic nature. It seems that the inventors were simply trying a
new concept, but it seems impractical for encrypting normal amounts of text. The Blum-
Goldwasser scheme seemed much more promising, as it was another public key scheme
that had similar performance to RSA. The flaw with Blum-Goldwasser comes from its
security, which is susceptible to chosen ciphertext attacks. At first this didn’t seem
debilitating to the scheme, but after further research there seems to be a very plausible
way an adversary could use this attack to find the private key and decipher the message.
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It would be unlikely that anyone would use a scheme with this weakness and no other
advantages, when other schemes are available.
With this information I was not sure probabilistic cryptography was going to be worth
studying at all. The main schemes I had seen were interesting but not really worth spend-
ing much time on. Thankfully, I found another scheme that was considered probabilistic
but was very different in its nature. This scheme was called the Paillier cyptosystem and
has gained a good amount of attention since it was invented in 1999. The main attraction
of this scheme is not that it is probabilistic. People are more interested in the fact it is
homomorphic. This means that after a text has been encrypted, simple mathematical
operations can be performed on the ciphertext [13]. The result can then be decrypted
showing the operations occurred correctly. This property can be very useful and has been
suggested to be used in electronic voting protocols and other areas. I have seen the Pail-
lier scheme used for its homomorphic properties in several protocols, although none have
made it to real world applications yet to my knowledge. There is more about the specific
homomorphic properties of these schemes in Appendix A.
After Paillier came the Damg˚ard-Jurik scheme which is really a derivation of Paillier’s
scheme. It allows for flexible length encoding with the same modulus n as a benefit.
Increasing the length of the encrypted text greatly increases the length of the ciphertext.
It will be determined later whether this benefit is practical and allows for faster encryption
and decryption. Due to their relevance and the promising future of their properties, I
will be spending most of my time studying these schemes. I have created software that
implements both of these schemes along with different tools to time the encryption and
decryption process. The program also uses an established version of RSA that I can
also run timings on. These timings should provide good data to evaluate if Paillier or
Damg˚ard-Jurik can perform comparably to RSA.
I will still be writing a history and overview of the Goldwasser-Micali and Blum-
Goldwasser schemes. Their current relevance seems limited, except when using Goldwasser-
Micali for bit encryption. They are both historically significant and mathematically inter-
esting, so I will explain in detail what is behind them and how they work, as well as their
shortcomings. I will also give a simple example of encryption and decryption for each.
Most of my time will be spent explaining the Paillier scheme and its derivative, Damg˚ard-
Jurik. These schemes are a bit more complicated and use properties and theorems that
are less well recognized. I will explain and give simple examples for both of these as well.
Fortunately, the Damg˚ard-Jurik scheme will have most of the same properties as Paillier
and I will just build off from what was already described.
4 Contributions to Probabilistic Cryptography
This section outlines the contributions I made to the field of probabilistic cryptography
and cryptography in general, during my master’s project. All of the points outlined are
unique to this project to the best of my knowledge. Since I could not find research on
these points previously recorded, I conducted my own research and reported it in this
paper.
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• Researched and reported a complete overview of several probabilistic cryptogra-
phy schemes in the same document. Two of the schemes, Goldwasser-Micali and
Blum-Goldwasser, appear to be less significant at this time. Both the Paillier and
Damg˚ard-Jurik schemes are being researched more because of their homomorphic
and probabilistic properties. Damg˚ard-Jurik also has the interesting trait of flexible
length encoding without increasing the key size.
• Explained the significance of the homomorphic properties of Paillier and Damg˚ard-
Jurik in Appendix A. I give a description of these useful properties and the mathe-
matics behind how they work.
• Helped to change the policy at Sun Microsystems to allow individuals not part of a
licensed software company to obtain a certificate that is necessary to create software
using the JCE. Without this policy change it is impossible for an individual to
create software in the JCE. This may have also been partly due to some help from a
professor. They seem more lenient now and I believe they will grant the certificate
to people interested in using the JCE to create cryptography tools. You will have
to contact Sun to find out.
• Using the Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) I implemented both the Paillier and
Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystems as a provider. Both systems can be accessed using the
JCE through my jar file. These schemes were built using the JCE so that they can
easily be pluged into different applications requiring public key encryption. Users
should note that they were implemented only for academic purposes.
• When implementing Paillier and Damg˚ard-Jurik schemes I spent considerable time
improving performance over the basic algorithms. I used hints given in the original
papers along with some ideas of my own to find the algorithms with the best per-
formance. I used the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) to greatly increase speed
in all algorithms, similar to methods used in most RSA implementations. I used
precomputed values in my algorithms as well as making sure all algorithms were
performing as few operations as possible. I found a different algorithm of decryp-
tion for the Paillier scheme that has a different performance. My final version of
each cryptosystem implements the fastest algorithms I was able to develop.
• Performed controlled tests on the cryptosystems RSA, Paillier, and Damg˚ard-Jurik.
After finding the quickest algorithms for Paillier and Damg˚ard-Jurik, I tested them
along with an RSA implementation to find which one performs best. I present my
results and give my opinions on the best schemes and their uses.
• Conversed with Mads J. Jurik about how to properly use the CRT when implement-
ing the Damg˚ard-Jurik scheme. Through our conversations I helped him realize that
the exponents used could be (p− 1) and (q − 1), instead of λ when using the CRT.
This is a large performance increase that he had not considered during his original
work. I outlined the entire algorithm of Damg˚ard-Jurik that uses the CRT, as I was
not able to find it anywhere else.
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• Developed an algorithm to use the CRT when implementing the Second Paillier
scheme. Recorded the algorithm in section on implementation and used algorithm
in my final implementation of Second Paillier scheme.
• Explained the significance of homomorphic properties of Paillier and Damg˚ard-Jurik
schemes in Appendix A. I give a description of these properties and their mathe-
matics.
5 Goldwasser-Micali Scheme
5.1 History
In 1984 Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali theorized the idea of probabilistic cryptography
[6]. Their scheme gave the ability to encrypt the same text in many different ways without
changing the modulus. This scheme was one of the first to be semantically secure, if not
the first. Semantic security is defined as the ciphertext not giving any useful information
about the plaintext in polynomial time, except possibly the length [20]. This scheme
introduced some new ideas, that helped to inspire a new line of probabilistic schemes. In
fact, the Paillier scheme seems to have emerged from this line. Although it is significant
for this purpose, Goldwasser-Micali doesn’t seem to have been studied much because of
its slow speed and huge expansion. For these reason it is doubtful that it could be used
for encrypting normal amounts of text. However, the scheme does well at bit encryption
because of its ability to encrypt bits to different values. For this reason the scheme may
find some practical uses.
5.2 Mathematical Background
Goldwasser-Micali encryption uses the quadratic residuosity problem as the basis for the
encryption. Assuming this problem is intractable then this scheme is secure. Of course,
like most encryption schemes, this has not been proven secure but seems to be a good
assumption.
A quadratic residue is simply an integer in Z∗n that for some x ∈ N is equivalent to
x2 mod n [15]. Since we are in mod n, the integers can be quadratic residues in several
ways. Most are values that would never be squares without evaluating with the modulus.
To understand the quadratic residues, we first need to understand the concepts of the
Legendre and Jacobi symbols [15]. The Legendre symbol can easily be found with the
formula:
(a
p
) ≡ a
p−1
2 mod p, where p is any odd prime.
If the value n is not prime then one has the Jacobi symbol ( a
n
) (which looks just like
the Legendre symbol). If the factorization of n = pe11 p
e2
2 ...p
ek
k the Jacobi symbol can be
defined with Legendre symbols as:
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( a
n
) = ( a
p1
)e1( a
p2
)e2 ...( a
pk
)ek .
The quadratic residuosity problem is defined as the following.
Definition 1 Given integers n and a ∈ Jn, where Jn is defined as all a ∈ Z
∗
n whose
Jacobi symbol is 1, find whether or not a is a quadratic residue modulo n.
To solve the Legendre symbol the value of n needs to be factored and then the equation
can be solved with the resulting Jacobi symbols. The Jacobi symbols can be solved by
the above method and the solutions can be multiplied together for the final solution.
This knowledge can be used to find quadratic residues. If there are only 2 factors of n,
p and q then we can easily find if a ∈ Qn, the set all quadratic residues modulus n. If the
Legendre symbol ( a
px
) = 1, where px is any of the prime factors, and the Jacobi symbol
( a
n
) = 1 then this is a quadratic residue. It is possible for the Jacobi symbol ( a
n
) = 1 but
a not be a quadratic residue. Because of this, without knowledge of p and q there is no
way to know if this a quadratic residue.
With the mathematical background of the quadratic residuosity problem, we are now
able to create the keys needed for encryption, and then encrypt and decrypt a message.
The following is the method used for generating the public and private keys.
Steps for Key Generation
1. Select two primes p and q that are about the same size.
2. Calculate modulus n = pq, the product of two primes.
3. Select y ∈ Zn that is also a pseudosquare mod n. A pseudosquare is a quadratic
non-residue modulo n with ( a
n
) = 1.
4. We now have the public key (n, y) and the private key (p, q)
The key generation is mostly straightforward for this scheme and resembles other
public keys schemes like RSA. The tricky part is creating the pseudosquare y. From
the name, one can infer that this value will look like a square. In this case, the Jacobi
symbol ( a
n
) = 1 is a test to see if a is quadratic residue modulo n. But just because the
Jacobi symbol is 1 doesn’t mean it is a quadratic residue. There is also a chance that
that this value is not a quadratic residue and it is precisely these values that represent
pseudosquares. There is a good trick for creating these values when n is a composite of
two primes p and q [10].
Steps for Finding Pseudosquare
1. Find two quadratic non-residues, a mod p and b mod q.
2. You want to find the number y mod n (remember n = pq) where y ≡ a mod p and
also y ≡ b mod q. This can be done using Chinese Remaindering.
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3. We know y is a quadratic non-residue mod n. This is because a mod p is in Q¯p (Q¯ is
the set of quadratic non-residues) and b mod q is in Q¯q, which implies they are both
quadratic non-residues mod n (see fact 2.137 in [10]). Remember that y ≡ a mod p
and y ≡ b mod q.
4. We also know by the properties of Jacobi and Legendre symbols that the Jacobi
symbol ( a
n
) = (a
p
)( b
q
) = (−1)(−1) = 1, since the Legendre symbol of quadratic
non-residues must be -1.
5. From all the above we can conclude we have a pseudosquare, since the Legendre
symbol (a
p
) = 1 and the Jacobi symbol ( a
n
) = 1.
Now that we have the public and private keys we can see how to do encryption with
Goldwasser-Micali. In our case Bob is encrypting a message m for Alice into a ciphertext
c. Bob has received the public key (n, y) that was generated by Alice.
Steps for Encryption
1. Convert message m to a binary string where m = m1m2m3...mt and t is the length
of string and each mi is either 0 or 1.
2. For i = 0 to t
(a) Pick a random value x ∈ Z∗n.
(b) If mi = 1 then ci = yx
2 mod n and if mi = 0 then ci = x
2 mod n.
3. The encrypted values ci are then placed in c where c = c1c2c3...ct where again t is
the size c.
It is clear from the encryption algorithm that this is an inefficient scheme and some-
what simplistic. Only one bit can be encrypted at a time and the expansion is very great.
Even with these characteristics I am fascinated that with the randomness one can encrypt
0’s and 1’s in so many ways and yet this is considered secure. It makes you wonder if there
are other easier methods to encrypt each bit, since all you need is two different outcomes.
This type of scheme could be usable when doing bit encryption but would take too long
for normal size encryption.
The decryption of ciphertext c of length t is as follows using the private key (p, q).
Steps for Decryption
1. For i = 0 to t
(a) Find the Legendre symbol li = (
ci
p
).
(b) If li = 1 then mi = 0, else mi = 1.
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2. The decrypted message is the string m = m1m2m3...mt.
The decryption process, as you can see, is as simple as figuring out if ci was encrypted
as quadratic residue modulo n or if it was encrypted as a pseudosquare. If ci is encrypted
as x2 modn then we obviously get a quadratic residue mod n, since that is the definition
of a quadratic residue. If ci = yx
2 then we must have a pseudosquare. This is because
the Jacobi symbol of y is ( y
n
) = −1 and the Jacobi symbol of x2 is (x
2
n
) = 1. Therefore
we get (−1)(1) = −1 which implies that yx2 is a pseudosquare modn. To quickly show
whether or not ci is a quadratic residue modulo n, we use a fact stated in [10] in section
2.137, which says that if ci is a quadratic residue modulo q or modulo p then we know it
is a quadratic residue modulo n. This can be done easily, since p and q are primes, with
either Legendre symbol ( ci
p
) or ( ci
q
).
The ability to find if a number is a quadratic residue modulo n using its factors p and
q is especially useful because no one knows a method of finding quadratic residue without
these factors. Since an effective way to factor large numbers is unknown, this scheme is
considered secure. The security of this scheme relies on the assumption that the quadratic
residuosity problem is difficult, but for now it seems to be secure. If a person were able
to intercept a message, all they would see would be pseudosquares and quadratic residues
modulo n. Assuming the value of n is large enough, they would not be able to get the
factors p and q and would not be able to calculate the Legendre symbol.
Below is a simple example of the Goldwasser-Micali scheme. You can tell from the
size of the numbers in the public and private keys that this is not realistic for a truely
secure example. But the mathematics are the same and help to cement in your mind how
the scheme works. The steps shown in the example below correspond to the algorithms
above, so you can compare.
Key Generation
1. p = 71, q = 61.
2. n = 4331.
3. I selected several random numbers to see if they were quadratic non-residues modulo
n. In the end I found the Legendre symbol (17
71
) ≡ 17(71−1)/2 (mod 71) ≡ −1 and
(23
61
) ≡ 23(61−1)/2 (mod 61) ≡ −1. You can then use Chinese Remaindering to find
the equivalent of both these numbers modn. We know the gcd(p, q) = 1 since they
are both prime, so we can first use the formula k ≡ (a− b)p−1 (mod q). Plugging
in the numbers we get k ≡ (23−17)71−1 (mod 61) ≡ 25 (mod 61). Then we can
substitute k into b+ pk (mod n) giving us 17 + 71 ∗ 25 ≡ 1792 (mod 4331). This
means we can use y = 1792 as our pseudosquare mod n.
This gives us the public key (n, y) = (4331, 1792) and the private key (p, q) = (71, 61).
Encryption
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We will now encrypt the message m = 9. This means m = 1001 in binary, which is
a good number to encrypt since there are two 0’s and two 1’s to encrypt. Obviously we
can encrypt much bigger numbers but we would just be encrypting the same two things
over and over in a certain order. Having two examples of each should be sufficient to
understand the process.
• m1 = 1
We choose x ∈ Z∗n so x = 12.
m1 = 1 so c1 ← yx
2 mod n which gives us
c1 = 1792 ∗ 12
2 = 2512 mod 4331.
• m2 = 0
We choose random x = 22.
m2 = 0 so c2 ← x
2 mod n which gives us
c2 = 22
2 = 484 mod 4331.
• m3 = 0
We choose random x = 81.
m3 = 0 so c3 ← x
2 mod n which gives us
c3 = 81
2 = 1378 mod 4331
• m4 = 1
We choose random x = 3001.
m4 = 1 so c4 ← yx
2 mod n which gives us
c4 = 1792 ∗ 3001
2 = 2421 mod 4331
This gives us the ciphertext c = (2519, 484, 1378, 2421) that is sent to Alice to be
decrypted.
Decryption
• c1 = 2519
We calculate the Legendre symbol ( c1
p
) ≡ c
(p−1)/2
1 mod p.
This gives us (2519
71
) = 2519((71−1)/2) mod 71 = −1.
Because we get −1, m1 = 1.
• c2 = 484
The Legendre symbol (484
71
) ≡ 484((71−1/2) mod 71 = 1.
Since we get 1, m2 = 0.
• c3 = 1378
The Legendre symbol (1378
71
) ≡ 1378((71−1/2) mod 71 = 1.
Since we get 1, m3 = 0.
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• c4 = 1238
The Legendre symbol (1238
71
) ≡ 1238((71−1/2) mod 71 = −1.
Since we get −1, m4 = −1.
As you can see when we concatenate m together again we get m = 1001 in binary or
m = 9, which is what we started with.
5.3 Summary of Scheme
As you can see from the information provided, this scheme works and appears to be
semantically secure. The problem is that the scheme has a message expansion around
lg2 n [10]. The value of n would need to be hundreds of bits long to prevent factorization
and finding the private key. This means that each bit of the ciphertext would need to be
expanded to just smaller than n. In an example that was reasonably secure this would
make the ciphertext hundreds of times larger than the original message. Because of this
fact, this scheme is not used practically but it may become useful for encrypting small
amounts, such as invidual bits. The other probabilistic schemes covered later have much
potential for normal encryption than this one.
6 Blum-Goldwasser Scheme
6.1 History
After the Goldwasser-Micali scheme came the Blum-Goldwasser scheme in 1985, which is
based on the Blum-Blum-Shub generator [4]. The Blum-Goldwasser scheme is comparable
in speed to another public key scheme, RSA. With this in mind, it does seem possible
that this scheme may have potential to be studied and used in applications where RSA is
currently used. Unfortunately, it is not as robust as RSA, since it has been shown to be
susceptible to chosen ciphertext attacks. Because of this, the scheme has not generated
much interest and has not been studied recently.
6.2 Mathematical Background
The Blum-Goldwasser scheme uses the Blum-Blum-Shub generator to create a pseudo-
random bit sequence that is used for encryption. The Blum-Blum-Shub generator is
considered a cryptographically secure pseudorandom bit generator under the assumption
that integer factorization is intractable [15]. It provides a solid foundation encoding and
decoding as you will see late in this section.
The first step to understanding Blum-Goldwasser is understanding how the Blum-
Blum-Shub (BBS) generator works. The heart of this scheme is just creating a random
quadratic residue x0 and then encrypting all values with basic math and XOR’s. When
decrypting it is difficult to retrieve the random quadratic residue x0. Once you have that,
you just use the same math and XOR’s to retrieve the plaintext.
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The Blum-Blum-Shub generator generates a pseudorandom bit sequence z1, z2, ..., zl
of length l. The following method describes it [10].
Steps for Blum-Blum-Shub generator
1. Select two distinct large primes p and q each congruent to 3 (mod 4).
2. Calculate modulus n = pq, the product of two primes.
3. Select the random seed s where 1 ≤ s ≤ n− 1 such that gcd(s, n) = 1.
4. Compute x0 ← s
2 (mod n).
5. For i to l compute the following:
(a) xi ← x
2
i−1 (mod n).
(b) zi ← the least significant bit of xi (in our case we will use more than the least
significant bit).
6. The sequence that is output ends up as z1, z2, ..., zl.
As you can see from the algorithm, you select both the modulus and the seed with
specific properties. Then square the seed and take its modulus, which gives a value where
the least significant bit is considered random. To get more random bits, keep squaring the
answer and taking the modulus. The algorithm is designed so that you can’t predict the
results without knowing the initial seed and modulus. In the Blum-Goldwasser scheme
we will use not just the least significant bit, but several bits.
Now that we have seen the Blum-Blum-Shub generator we can see how it is incorpo-
rated into the scheme. The first step in describing Blum-Goldwasser is generating the
public and private keys.
Steps for Key Generation
1. Select two large primes p and q that are about the same size and are congruent to
3 mod 4.
2. Calculate the modulus n = pq, the product of two primes.
3. Calculate a and b such that ap + bq = 1. This can be done with the extended
Euclidean algorithm [15].
4. We now have the public key (n) and the private key (p, q, a, b).
With the private and public keys we can perform encryption and decryption.
Steps for Encryption
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1. Let k ← blg nc and h← blg kc.
2. The message m is represented as a string where m = m1m2...mt of length t. Each
piece mi is a binary string h bits long.
3. Select a seed x0, which is also a quadratic residue modulo n. This is done by
randomly choosing an integer r ∈ Z∗n and setting x0 = r
2 mod n.
4. Compute the following using x0
for i = 1 to t:
(a) Find xi = x
2
i−1 mod n.
(b) We let pi be the h least significant bits of xi.
(c) Now compute ci = pi ⊕mi, which gives us the ciphertext.
5. Compute xt+1 = x
2
t mod n, which is a value that is sent with the ciphertext to help
recalculate the seed x0.
6. This gives us ciphertext c = (c1, c2, ..., ct, xt+1) which can be used with the pri-
vate key for decryption. You can note the value xt+1 is not a typical ciphertext
value, since it was not derived in any way from the plaintext, but is necessary for
decryption.
The key to understanding this encryption is in step 3. As you can see x0 is just a
random quadratic residue modulo n. With the seed x0, you repeatedly square it modulo n
and take the result to get each value xi. The masking of the text is done with the simple
XOR operation. Take the bits xi and XOR them with the bits mi, which computes the
ciphertext ci.
The key to the decryption, as you will see next, is retrieving the value x0. Once you
get this value back, you can easily recompute each xi, perform the XOR with ci, and
regain the original text. We are able to retrieve this value using xt+1, which is sent with
the ciphertext.
The steps to the decryption of ciphertext c using private key (p,q,a,b) is as follows.
Steps for Decryption
1. Compute d1 = (
p+1
4
)t+1 (mod p− 1).
2. Compute d2 = (
q+1
4
)t+1 (mod q − 1).
3. Compute u = xd1t+1 mod p.
4. Compute v = xd2t+1 mod q.
5. Compute x0 = vap + ubq mod n.
6. Compute the following using x0 for i = 1 to t:
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(a) Find xi = x
2
i−1 mod n.
(b) We let pi be the h least significant bits of xi.
(c) Now compute mi = pi ⊕ ci.
As you can see in the decryption, the majority of the work is computing the value x0
from the private key values p and q and the value xt+1.
The way we know this works starts with the fact that x
p−1
2
t ≡ 1. This is true because
of Fermat’s Little Theorem (see [16]) which states:
Theorem 1 If p is a prime and p does not divide a, then ap−1 ≡ 1 mod p.
This works in our case because xt is a quadratic residue so we know x
1
2
t exists and will
work in Fermat’s Little Theorem. We can rewrite our congruence as x
( 1
2
)(p−1)
t ≡ 1. Now
that we know this, observe that:
x
p+1
4
t+1 ≡ (x
2
t )
p+1
4 ≡ x
p−1
2
t xt ≡ xt (mod p).
Remember that xt+1 ≡ x
2
t mod p. So the above formula gives us a way to take a
quadratic residue and find the value which was squared to create it. This process can be
repeated to find as many quadratic residues as needed. We know in our case this will be
(t + 1) times to retrieve x0:
x
(p+1
4
)2
t+1 ≡ xt−1 mod p
which leads to the following formula used in steps 1 and 3 of our algorithm:
u ≡ xd1t+1 ≡ x
(p+1
4
)t+1
t+1 ≡ x0 mod p.
This can also be done using q, the other factor of n. This gives us the following
formulas used in steps 2 and 4 in our algorithm:
v ≡ xd2t+1 ≡ x
( q+1
4
)t+1
t+1 ≡ x0 mod q.
Both values u and v are congruent to x0 mod p and mod q respectively but we are
looking for x0 mod n. This can be found using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (see [16])
and the values a and b that are generated in the key generation. Now that we have the
root x0 we can generate values x1 to xt and compute the plaintext from the ciphertext.
Notice that step 6 in decryption is the same as step 4 in encryption, except you calculate
the plaintext mi from pi and the ciphertext ci.
Here is a simple example of the Blum-Goldwasser encryption scheme. As you can tell
from the size of the modulus, it would not be considered secure against attacks, but is
sufficient to show how the mathematics work. The numbering of the steps below will
correspond to the algorithms we described above.
Key Generation Example
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1. p = 607, q = 563 where both p and q = 3 mod 4.
2. n = pq = 341741.
3. Using the Extended Euclidean algorithm to calculate a(607) + b(563) = 1. This
gives us a = 64 and b = −69.
We get the public key n = (341741) and the private key (p, q, a, b) = (607, 563, 64,−69).
Encryption Example
We will now encrypt the value m = 49827.
1. • k = blog2nc = blog2341741c = 18.
• h = blog2kc = blog218c = 4.
2. We pick a random number r = 4561 ∈ Z∗n that we use to create our base quadratic
residue. This gives us x0 = 4561
2 mod n = 298261 mod 341741.
3. For i = 1 to 4
(a) • x1 = x
2
0 mod n = 317603 mod 341741.
• The 4 least significant digits of x1 base 2, p1 = 0011.
• This ciphertext c1 = 0011⊕ 1100 = 1111.
(b) • x2 = x
2
1 mod n = 340929 mod 341741.
• The 4 least significant digits of x2 base 2, p2 = 0001.
• This ciphertext c2 = 0001⊕ 0010 = 0011.
(c) • x3 = x
2
2 mod n = 316380 mod 341741.
• The 4 least significant digits of x3 base 2, p3 = 1100.
• This ciphertext c3 = 1100⊕ 1010 = 0110.
(d) • x4 = x
2
3 mod n = 23759 mod 341741.
• The 4 least significant digits of x4 base 2, p4 = 1111.
• This ciphertext c4 = 1111⊕ 0011 = 1100.
4. We also need to calculate x5 = x
2
4 mod n = 275690 mod 341741.
5. The ciphertext that is sent is (c1, c2, c3, c4, x5) = (1111, 0011, 0110, 1100, 275690).
Decryption Example
1. • d1 = (
p+1
4
)t+1 (mod p− 1).
• d1 = (
608
4
)5 (mod 606).
• d1 = 464.
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2. • d2 = (
q+1
4
)t+1 (mod q − 1).
• d2 = (
564
4
)5 (mod 562).
• d2 = 483.
3. • u = xd1t+1 (mod p).
• u = 275690464 (mod 607).
• u = 224.
4. • v = xd2t+1 (mod q).
• v = 275690483 (mod 563).
• v = 434.
5. • x0 = vap + ubq (mod n).
• x0 = 434(64)(607) + 224(−69)(563).
• x0 = 298261 (mod 341741).
6. We can now recalculate the values xi from x0 and use them to decrypt the ciphertext.
For i = 1 to 4.
(a) • x1 = x
2
0 mod n = 317603 (mod 341741).
• The 4 least significant digits of x1 base 2, p1 = 0011.
• This plaintext m1 = 0011⊕ 1111 = 1100.
(b) • x2 = x
2
1 mod n = 340929 (mod 341741).
• The 4 least significant digits of x2 base 2, p2 = 0001.
• This ciphertext m2 = 0001⊕ 0011 = 0010.
(c) • x3 = x
2
2 mod n = 316380 (mod 341741).
• The 4 least significant digits of x3 base 2, p3 = 1100.
• This ciphertext m3 = 1100⊕ 0110 = 1010.
(d) • x4 = x
2
3 mod n = 23759 (mod 341741).
• The 4 least significant digits of x4 base 2, p4 = 1111.
• This ciphertext m4 = 1111⊕ 1100 = 0011.
You can then concatenate the values of mi together again and get m = 1100001010100011
base 2 or m = 49827. The real test of whether or not the decryption will work is if you
correctly recalculate the value x0 in step 5, which is most of the work. The rest of the
work in step 6 is mostly the same as step 4 of the encryption, except you are calculating
the plaintext instead of the ciphertext.
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6.3 Summary of Scheme
So far from what we’ve seen this scheme looks pretty good. The efficiency is much better
than Goldwasser-Micali, as the expansion is only a reasonably sized constant value. All
the encrypted values ci are exactly the same size as the plaintext values mi. This only
leaves the value xt+1 as the expansion. The speed of Blum-Goldwasser also does very well,
especially compared to RSA. According to [10], it is just faster or just slower than RSA
depending on the exact situation and whether or not special efficient values are chosen
for RSA.
If you are looking for the catch, here it is: The security of the scheme has been shown
to be vulnerable to chosen-ciphertext attacks. This may not seem that devastating if
you can prevent an adversary from getting a carefully selected message encrypted with
Blum-Goldwasser. Unfortunately, the practicality of this is very feasible. In [20] there is
a description of several strategies for attacking this scheme by sending carefully selected
values to be encrypted and evaluating the results. This leads to Wenbo’s evaluation that
the security notion “is hopelessly weak.”[20] With this type of assessment from other
cryptography experts as well, it is no wonder this scheme has also not found any practical
uses. It is also generally just studied as an interesting concept without a good use.
7 Paillier Scheme
7.1 History
The Paillier scheme was first published by Pascal Paillier in 1999. This probabilistic
scheme has generated a good amount of interest and further study since it was discov-
ered. The main interest seems to be centered around another property it possesses: the
homomorphic property allows this scheme to do simple addition operations on several en-
crypted values and obtain the encrypted sum. The encrypted sum can later be decrypted
without ever knowing the values that made up the sum. Because of this useful character-
istic the scheme has been suggested for use in the design of voting protocols, threshold
cryptosystems, watermarking, secret sharing schemes, private information retrieval, and
server-aided polynomial evaluation.
7.2 Mathematical Background
The basis of the Paillier scheme is composite residuosity. In our case n = pq is a composite
since n is a composite of pq. This gives us the following definition from [14].
Definition 2 A number z is said to be an nth residue modulo n2 if there exists
a number y ∈ Z∗n2 such that z = y
n mod n2.
The problem of trying to distinguish nth residues from non-nth residues is seen as
hard enough to form the basis of this scheme. This problem is known to be random
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self-reducible so that all of its instances are polynomially equivalent. In Wikipedia, the
definition of a function that possesses random self-reducibility is [2]:
Definition 3 A good algorithm for the average case implies a good algorithm for the worst
case. Random self-reducibility is the ability to solve all instances of a problem by solving
a large fraction of the instances.
Therefore the problem is either easily solvable everywhere or not at all (random self-
reducibility will be discussed more when showing how it is used in the Paillier scheme).
Currently, like RSA and others, there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve the Paillier
algorithm without the private key.
First there are a couple of functions that we will discuss, since they are important
in understanding how Paillier’s scheme works. The first is the somewhat popular Euler
totient function, which is generally denoted as φ(n). The function is defined [10]:
Definition 4 For n the product of two primes p and q, φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
The second function is the Carmichael function, which seems much less known and is
generally denoted as λ(n) or just λ with the n assumed. The function is defined as follows
with some interesting properties [18] [19]:
Definition 5 For n the product of two primes p and q, λ(n) = lcm(p− 1, q − 1).
For any w ∈ Z∗n2, w
λ = 1 mod n and wλn = 1 mod n2.
We can now talk about the framework that will be used for encryption. It is defined
as follows:
Definition 6 For g ∈ Z∗n2 we denote the function Eg(x, y) → g
xyn mod n2, where x ∈
Zn, y ∈ Z
∗
n.
By observing some special cases using Eg, one can see how to create a solid scheme
that always works and is hard to decipher.
The first thing to discuss is this lemma, referred to in [14].
Lemma 1 If the order of g is a nonzero multiple of n then Eg is bijective.
The definition of bijective tells us that when g follows the criteria of the lemma, there
will be one unique solution to the function Eg when given the values for x and y. In other
words given the needed values, Eg(x, y) yields one solution, instead of 2 or more if g does
not follow the criteria of the lemma. This lemma allows us to know that by using the
proper value of g we always have a good solution. This ability to encrypt one value to
exactly one solution is important in any cryptosystem. It would be impossible to decrypt
a value that could come from two different encrypted vales or encrypt a value that gave
no solution.
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Looking at the charactertics of g according to the lemma, it says we want the order of g
to be a multiple of n. Recalling the definition, we know that the order is the least positive
t where gt = 1 mod n [15]. In our case we are working in mod n2, so we are looking for
the orders that are multiples of n, so t = nα mod (n2) which means gαn = 1 mod n2 for
some α. By the properties of the Carmichael function we know that the highest order of
g is nλ, which shows us that 1 ≤ α ≤ λ. The set of elements in Z∗n2 of order nα where
1 ≤ α ≤ λ is referred to as β by Paillier and will be the set used to select g.
While the mathematics of making g any element of β works, the practicality of it may
not. So far I haven’t seen an efficient method for finding an arbitrary value in β. Paillier
suggests choosing a g at random and then checking whether
gcd(L(gλ mod n2), n) = 1.
It could take a good amount of time to find g ∈ β with this method, especially since it
can be hard to find these values. Fortunately we are not left with choosing any value in β,
but we have a much better choice. Practically, it seems that (1 + n) ∈ β works well in all
circumstances and is easily computed. In fact, Paillier uses this value in his proofs. It also
seems more recent sources have dropped the value of g altogether and simply replaced
it with 1 + n (see [1]). As we will see, all good values of g are equivalent, so it makes
great sense to remain with 1 + n which always works. The explanation above describing
all values of β may be unnecessary. Rest assured that setting g = 1 + n seems to always
work in proofs, besides being simpler to understand and compute.
With the previous information we can define the equation that [14] uses.
Definition 7 Assume that g ∈ β. For w ∈ Z∗n2, we call the nth residuosity class of
w with respect to g the unique integer x ∈ Zn for which there exists y ∈ Z
∗
n such that
Eg(x, y) = w.
and
Definition 8 If w ∈ Z∗n2, define [w]g as the smallest non-negative ineteger x such that w
is expressible as w = gxyn mod n2, where g ∈ Z∗n2 and y ∈ Z
∗
n.
The notation for [w]g came from Benaloh’s Ph.D. on residue classes [3]. Paillier used
the same notation but it a somewhat confusing manner. He calls [w]g the class of w
without ever really defining what it is. I use a definition similar to the one in Benaloh’s
Ph.D., which is simpler to understand and never uses the term class to my knowledge.
The basic meaning of [w]g implies that we are given g ∈ β and w ∈ Z
∗
n2. There is also the
random value y ∈ Z∗n that could be many values. With these values we are able to find x.
By finding [w]g, we find the exponent of g, which is x. In the equation w = g
xyn mod n2
we are given w, g, y, and n. As you will see later on, we use x as the value being encrypted.
Thus solving [w]g becomes the act of decryption and will give us back the original value.
Another useful observation that Paillier makes is that this problem is random self-
reducible. You can recall the definition we gave earlier in this section. Basically, it refers
to all instances of a problem being polynomially equivalent when a certain criteria is met
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[2]. This is done by showing that when evaluating the worst case scenario of a function,
it is polynomially equivalent to the average case. There still may be significant difference
in time between the average and worse cases but the important factor is the polynomial
time. Because the complexity of the average and worst cases are equivalent for random
instances of the function, we are able to call it random self-reducible. This should give a
good overview of the concept. If this concept is completely unknown to you, it may help
to view the source [2] to get a full decription of random self-reducibility.
In our case the problem of computing [w]g given w is random self-reducible in two ways.
In his paper Paillier proves that this problem is random self-reducible over w ∈ Z∗n2, and
also over g ∈ β. In essence, these two observations show that the problem of finding the
class is equally as hard, no matter what values of w and g are chosen from the given sets.
This leads to the definition of the Composite Residuosity Class Problem from [14].
Definition 9 We call the Composite Residuosity Class Problem the computational prob-
lem Class[n] defined as follows: given w ∈ Z∗n2 and g ∈ β, compute [w]g.
It is also shown that the problem Class[n] is equivalent to the problem of factoring n.
This shows that there is no known polynomial time algorithm to solve Class[n]. It should
be equivalent to the the RSA scheme as far as security goes. Since RSA seems to be one
of the current standards, it bodes well for Paillier’s scheme as far as security is concerned.
At this point we can start to describe a method to solve the problem Class[n]. Before
doing this we need to describe a set of integers Sn and the function L.
Sn = {u < n
2|u = 1 mod n}
This leads to the following function.
u ∈ Sn, L(u) =
u−1
n
Now that we have this we are able to describe this Lemma from [14] which shows a
method used to retrieve [w] when given w. Keep in mind this is the unique number x
that was descibed earlier in the base equation. You will also see that the value x is the
plaintext we are retrieving.
Lemma 2 For any w ∈ Z∗n2, L(w
λ mod n2) = λ[w]1+n mod n.
To demonstrate this works we let g = (1 + n) ∈ β. Since we already know that
all g ∈ β are equivalent, we can use this simple g to prove Class[n] is always solvable.
We already know that w = (1 + n)xyn mod n2 when we replace g with (1 + n). By the
previous definition we are looking for the exponent of (1 +n) or [w]1+n, which is called x.
So putting this all together we get:
Equation 1.
wλ = (1 + n)xλynλ = (1 + n)xλ = 1 + xλn mod n2.
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Now we apply this answer to L(u):
L(1 + xλn) = λx = λ[w]1+n.
You can see using the Carmichael function makes the base y disappear. Then we just
expand what is left, taking the modulus n2. Then applying the definitions in the lemma,
we see the desired outcome.
In [14], Paillier also proves that:
[w]g2 = [w]g1[g2]
−1
g1 mod n.
This property allows us to take the Class of w base g1 and the class of g2 base g1 and
returns the class of w base g2. Since we know how to solve the class problem we can form
the following equations with g1 = (n + 1):
Equation 2.
L(wλ mod n2)
L(gλ mod n2)
=
λ[w]g1
λ[g]g1
=
[w]g1
[g]g1
= [w]g mod n.
The above equation does work correctly but while trying out examples of the decryp-
tion I realized these last steps are unnecessary. The denominator L(gλ mod n2) just gives
us the value λ mod n. Since we already know λ, calculating this is completely unneces-
sary. In practicality, the value L(gλ mod n2) can be calculated before the decryption as
part of the key generation, so it doesn’t make the scheme much faster. Nonetheless, it is
unnecessary and a simpler equation is:
Equation 3.
L(wλ mod n2)
λ
= λ[w]g
λ
= [w]g mod n.
With these equations complete, we have everything needed to describe the encryption
and decryption. I will use my simpler equation for the decryption.
Steps for Key Generation
1. Select two large primes p and q about the same size.
2. Calculate the modulus n, the product of two primes.
3. Find a g ∈ β. Since g = (1 + n) works and is easily calculated, this is the best
choice.
4. We have the public key (n, g) and the private key (p, q).
Steps for Encryption
1. Plaintext is m where m < n.
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2. Find a random r ∈ Z∗n. (Some sources say r ∈ Zn but this will not work in the
Carmichael function.)
3. Let ciphertext c = gmrn mod n2.
One can see, the encryption is a simple equation but calculating it will not be quick.
The exponentiation is very expensive, since the exponents are both around the same size
as the modulus. Looking at the form of the equation, one will see that the decryption will
be done by first removing the random part rn, then retrieving the exponent m mod n2.
Steps for Decryption
In my research, I found there is a newer method of decryption in later writings on
Paillier’s scheme [1]. The newer decryption seems to be simpler and quicker. I will describe
both methods since they work in similar ways. I will refer to the original algorithm as
Original Paillier or just the Paillier scheme for short and I will refer to the newer algorithm
as the Second Paillier scheme.
Original Paillier Method
1. The ciphertext c < n2.
2. Retrieve plaintext m = L(c
λ mod n2)
λ
mod n
(In Paillier’s paper, he uses L(gλ mod n2) as the denominator but I showed above
this is unnecessary).
Second Paillier Method
1. The ciphertext c < n2.
2. Calculate α, where αn = 1 mod φ(n).
3. Let r = cα mod φ(n) mod n.
4. Retrieve plaintext m = L(c · r−n mod n2).
For Paillier’s original method of decryption we have already shown how it works.
Looking at Equation 1, we can see how to extract the exponent from w using properties
of the Carmichael function and the L function. All that needs to be done after Equation
1 is remove the coefficient λ, which is most easily done with Equation 3. You can also try
Paillier’s method in Equation 2, which requires a couple more steps.
The second method works in similar ways, but it is more like RSA decryption because
it uses the Euler totient function. This method is explained in [1] but I haven’t found
who first discovered this decryption method. To decrypt with this method first compute:
αn = 1 mod φ(n).
This can be solved using the extended Euclidean algorithm [16] to find n−1. With this
information we can then compute:
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r = cα mod φ(n) mod n.
To solve the above computation, evaluate c = (1 + n)mrn in mod n. This causes
(1 + n)m = 1 mod n since n to any exponent will be 0. This leaves us with r1+kφ which
takes the same form as the RSA equation. In the same way as RSA, we know rφ = 1 mod n
by Euler’s theorem and we are left with r. With the value of r at our disposal we can
solve for the plaintext m:
L(c · r−n mod n2) =
L(((1 + n)m · rn) · r−n mod n2) =
L(1 + nm mod n2) = m.
We can use our knowledge of r to find its inverse and then negate r from the equation.
This leaves us with (1 + n)m which simplifies to (1 + nm) mod n2 and all we need to do
is apply the L function.
One can see, both methods eliminate the value r by forcing it to be 1. The first
method uses Carmichael’s function and the second Euler’s totient function. After that,
simply evaluate what is left mod n2, which leaves only a few simple operations to yield
the answer. We will implement both methods in the software portion of this study and
evaluate which one is faster.
Key Generation Example
1. p = 11, q = 17.
2. n = 187.
3. g = (n + 1) = 188.
4. We get the public key (n, g) = (187, 188, 97) and the private key (p, q) = (11, 17).
Encryption Example
1. Plaintext m = 100.
2. r = 97 ∈ Z∗n.
3. Let ciphertext c = 188100 · 97187 mod 34969 = 26118.
Decryption Example
Original Paillier Method
1. The ciphertext 26118 < 34969.
2. Remember L(u) = u−1
n
.
26
• Calculate λ =lcm(17− 1, 11− 1) = 80.
• m = L(26118
80 mod 34969)
80
mod 187
(You could also calculate L(18880 mod 34969) = 80 for the denominator in
Paillier’s method).
• m = 146
80
mod 187.
• 80−1 = 180 mod 187.
• m = 146 · 180 mod 187 = 100.
Second Paillier Method
1. The ciphertext 26118 < 34969.
2. Calculate φ(n) = 160.
α187 = 1 mod 160.
α = 187−1 mod 160 = 83.
3. Let r = 2611883 mod 187 = 97.
We can see that this successfully retrieved our original r.
4. • Calculate rn = 97187 mod 34969 = 31541.
• Therefore r−n = 31541−1 mod 34969 = 30858.
• We can retrieve plaintext m = L(26118 · 30858 mod 34969).
• m = L(18701) = 100.
7.3 Summary of Scheme
The Paillier system has some properties that make it appealing for different uses. Its
probabilistic nature is a good feature, but the main interest in the scheme is the homo-
morphic property. This has spawned a good amount of interest and there seems to be
a good chance we could see it used in practical applications. So far I have not seen any
evidence that it is used in any commercial applications, but keep in mind it was only
published in 1999. It takes many years of scrutiny before a new cryptosystem becomes
practical and trusted.
I am starting to see it used in newer protocols for electronic cash, electronic voting [1]
and Private Information Retrieval [9]. These protocols need the additively homomorphic
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properties that are not common in cryptosystems. To my understanding these things are
still being researched but there is much interest and they could be gaining momentum. I
still think it will be at least a couple of years, if not longer, before we see the real world
applications on the market.
The efficiency is good but it will always be inherently slower than RSA. The differ-
ence is greatest in encryption where exponentiation of gm takes much longer than any
calculation in RSA encryption. This is just a longer calculation that needs to occur. The
ciphertext c will always be less than n but is encrypted to the size of n2, so the expansion
is 2. This is definitely not great but could be acceptable if we find special uses for the
scheme.
I have found no claims that the system is susceptible to attacks and haven’t discovered
any flaws myself. One can see in my description of the scheme, the mathematics contain
many of the same principles as RSA, and one can decrypt the ciphertext using similar
algorithms. This bodes well for the scheme as far as security is concerned, since RSA has
been accepted as secure for many years. The only way to break the scheme I have seen
is by factoring the modulus n, which should be set to the appropriate size to avoid this
problem.
In conclusion, I do believe that Paillier’s scheme has great potential, which is evidenced
in all the attention it has received recently. Since Paillier will inherently be slower than
schemes like RSA, its real test will be finding applications that need the homomorphic
property. It is probable that if an implementation of Paillier can be close to RSA in
speed, it will find its way into applications. This may take a little time, as the current
implementation seems a bit slow. I will show the results from my own testing later on
and compare it with other schemes.
8 Damg˚ard-Jurik Scheme
8.1 History
The Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem [5] was first introduced just after Paillier’s in 2000.
Damg˚ard-Jurik is really just a modification to Paillier’s system that allows a user to
increase the size of the encrypted value. Due to its nature, it is also called the Generalized
Paillier system. Damg˚ard-Jurik’s scheme has also generated some interest, since it shares
similar properties with Paillier’s scheme. Both are probabilistic and more importantly
both are homomorphic. This allows them to be mentioned as possibilities for the same
applications: voting protocols, threshold cryptosystems, watermarking, secret sharing
schemes, private information retrieval, and server-aided polynomial evaluation.
The question to be answered with Damg˚ard-Jurik is whether or not the implemen-
tation will improve over Paillier’s implementation, which isn’t particularly quick. The
big advantage of Damg˚ard-Jurik is that one can potentially encrypt an arbitrarily large
value in one try. Other schemes must divide the message into smaller pieces and before
encrypting. We will see if this advantage helps the system succeed.
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8.2 Mathematical Background
As we already stated, Damg˚ard-Jurik is a variation on the Paillier scheme. Therefore, the
explanation will assume that Paillier is already understood and I will refer to the previous
section on Paillier instead of explaining the same concepts over.
The main difference between the two schemes is the amount of plaintext space that
can be encrypted at once. In the Paillier cryptosystem we are limited to a plaintext p < n
and a ciphertext c < n2. This gives the plaintext space of Zn and ciphertext space of Zn2.
In Damg˚ard-Jurik it is generalized to not be limited by the modulus n. Instead it allows
the plaintext space to be Zns and a ciphertext space of Zns+1, where theoretically s can
be any integer. In essence, you are allowed to encrypt any size plaintext without dividing
it into chunks by choosing the proper s.
Thinking back to the Paillier scheme, we defined the framework of the encryption as
Eg(x, y) → g
xyn mod n2. We build off from this and generalize it to get the following
framework for Damg˚ard-Jurik [5].
Definition 10 For g ∈ Z∗ns+1 and s < p, q we define Eg(m, y)→ g
myn
s
mod ns+1.
With this equation, we get a plaintext space of Zns and a random space of Zn. Together
we get Zns×Zn = Zns+1 which is the ciphertext space. You can see this allows us to make
the ciphertext almost unlimited in size by letting s be any value less than p, q. You can
also see setting s = 1 will give us the exact same space as Paillier. In fact, allowing s = 1
is the simplest case and reveals the Paillier scheme.
In [5], the authors take great care in showing that g ∈ (1 + n)jx mod ns+1 where j is
relatively prime to n and x ∈ Z∗n. Later on they explain that all security is equivalent
regardless of the g. They recommend using g = 1 + n, which we saw as the standard in
Paillier’s scheme. It is simple to calculate this value and it tends to be easier to use. In
the rest of this section we will assume g = 1 + n.
Damg˚ard and Jurik show that this equation is a direct product of the multiplicative
groups G × H [5]. G is the group that is cyclic of order ns, which implies the order of
G is ns. H is defined as the group isomorphic to Z∗n, which implies an order of φ(n) or
(p− 1)(q − 1). Together these give us ns(p− 1)(q − 1), which is also the size of Z∗ns+1 or
φ(ns+1).
We can now fill out the base equation with what is known to create the equation to
compute the ciphertext.
c = gmyn
s
where g = (1 + n)jx, y = r ∈ Z∗n
= (1 + n)mj(xmrn
s
)
From this we can see (1 +n)mj ∈ G and (xmrn
s
) ∈ H . Our goal is to extract m, which
is the message. As in Paillier, we will first try to eliminate the part ∈ H . We can do this
by finding d = 0 mod λ and d mod n ∈ Z∗n with the Chinese Remainder theorem [16]. We
use d as an exponent on the ciphertext in the following way.
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cd = (1 + n)mjd(xmrn
s
)d
= (1 + n)mjd(xdmrn
sd)
= (1 + n)mjd mod ns+1.
You can see that xdm becomes 1 because d = kλ where k is any integer. Since we know
by Carmichael’s theorem that xλ mod n = 1, it must be congruent mod ns+1 because ns+1
is a multiple of n. The value rn
sd = rn
s(p−1)(q−1) = 1 since nsd is a multiple of φ(n).
What remains is (1 + n)mjd mod ns+1. In Paillier’s scheme it was easy to extract the
exponent, which contains the value we are looking for, m. For Paillier, we get (1 +n)m =
1 + nm mod n2, because all terms greater than n disappear modulus n2. By using the
function L(u) described by Paillier, we are able to extract the message. The process we use
in this case is similar but it takes more steps to extract m. The algorithm seems similar
to the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm (see [10]), also used to calculate discrete logarithms.
Ultimately the algorithm is different, since Pohlig-Hellman will not work in this case.
The first observation needed is that we can generically expand what is left of our
equation using the Binomial Theorem. Using the function L(u) we defined in the section
on the Paillier scheme, we are able to expand to get the following.
Equation 4.
L((1 + n)i mod ns+1) = (i +
(
i
2
)
n + ... +
(
i
s
)
ns−1) mod ns.
With this information, we can’t simply extract i mod ns but we can extract i mod n1
as we did for Paillier’s scheme. This works for s = 1, but we need to define a method for
all cases. This can be done with a neat form of induction that extracts i for each modulus
one step at a time. We define each step:
i1 = i mod n
i2 = i mod n
2
i3 = i mod n
3
...
ij = i mod n
j .
We already know how to extract i1 and from this step we will be able to extract i2.
From i2 we can extract i3 and so on. This will eventually give us ij , no matter how big j
is. To understand the process, we first need to make several observations.
Equation 5.
ij = ij−1 + k ∗ n
j−1, where k ∈ Zn.
You can start to see that knowledge of ij−1 helps us to find ij .
After this we need to show another expansion similar to Equation 4, but this uses the
more specific value ij .
Equation 6.
L((1 + n)i mod nj+1) = (ij +
(
ij
2
)
n + ... +
(
ij
j
)
nj−1) mod nj .
30
One can then notice the following:
Equation 7.
For j > t > 0 one will always have
(
ij
t+1
)
nt =
(
ij−1
t+1
)
nt mod nj .
Looking closely reveals how this works. We know from Equation 5 we can replace ij
with ij−1 + k ∗ n
j−1. This gives us
(
ij
t+1
)
nt =
(
ij−1+k∗nj−1
t+1
)
nt mod nj . Keep in mind that
when we calculate the combinations we can multiply each (ij−1 + k ∗ n
j−1) by nt. In the
smallest case nt = n, which yields the following (ij−1+k∗n
j−1)n = (ij−1n+k∗n
j). When
this is evaluated mod nj the contributions from k ∗ nj will disappear. This observation
gives us the above result we were looking for.
With the observations in Equations 5 and 7, ij−1 can be substituted for ij in Equation
6.
Equation 8.
L((1 + n)i mod nj+1) = (ij−1 + k ∗ n
j−1 +
(
ij−1
2
)
n + ... +
(
ij−1
j
)
nj−1) mod nj .
By eliminating all ij from our equation we are almost at a place we can solve for ij .
Putting Equations 5-8 together creates an equation to solve for ij with the knowledge of
ij−1.
ij = ij−1 + k ∗ n
j−1
= ij−1 + L((1 + n)
i mod nj+1)− (ij−1 +
(
ij−1
2
)
n + ... +
(
ij−1
j
)
nj−1) mod nj .
This leads to our final equation for Damg˚ard-Jurik.
Equation 9.
ij = L((1 + n)
i mod nj+1)− (
(
ij−1
2
)
n + ... +
(
ij−1
j
)
nj−1) mod nj .
You can see in the first step, I substitute what I know k ∗ nj−1 equals from Equation
8. In the next step the terms ij−1 cancel each other out and we have our final result.
This equation only gives us knowledge of ij from ij−1 and this may not be the answer
we need. But one can keep repeating the algorithm over and over using induction each
time. Eventually, one will reach the ij desired. The value i1 can always be calculated to
start the induction.
An algorithm for calculating ij for any j ∈ Zn is provided later in the “Steps for
Decryption” subsection. You will see that while this algorithm does work, it seems to
be quite expensive. There are many steps and the larger s becomes the more steps are
necessary. We will see if the extra complexity is offset by the ability to encrypt larger
values.
Keep in mind the value i = jmd is not the final answer. We are actually looking
for the message m. At this point it is easy to find m since we have knowledge of j and
d. Therefore, just calculate (jd)−1 mod ns using the extending Euclidean algorithm (see
[16]). Plug the answer into the equation jmd ∗ (jd)−1 = m mod ns and the message m
can be computed.
Steps for Key Generation
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1. Select two large primes p and q about the same size.
2. Calculate the modulus n, the product of two primes.
3. Find g ∈ Z∗ns+1 such that g = (1 + n)
jx mod ns+1 where gcd(j,n) = 1 and x ∈ H . I
recommend using g = (1+n) since it is simple and works as well as any other value.
4. Choose d such that d mod n ∈ Z∗n and d = 0 mod λ. This can be done with the
Chinese Remainder Theorem.
5. We have the public key (n, g) and the secret key (d, j).
Steps for Encryption
1. Choose s ∈ Zn such that one can encrypt as much as desired.
2. The plaintext is m where m < ns.
3. Find a random r ∈ Z∗n.
4. Let the ciphertext c = gmrn
s
mod ns+1.
Comparing with Paillier will reveal why this scheme is also known as the Generalized
Paillier scheme. The Paillier algorithm is still present but the exponent n is replaced with
ns and the modulus n2 is replaced with ns+1.
Steps for Decryption
1. The ciphertext c < ns+1.
2. Calculate cd = (1 + n)jmd mod n
s
.
3. Calculate jmd with the following algorithm where a = (1 + n)jmd.
i := 0;
for j := 1 to s
{
t1 := L(a mod n
j+1);
t2 := i;
for k := 2 to j
{
i := i− 1;
t2 := t2 ∗ i mod n
j ;
t1 := t1 −
t2∗nk−1
k!
mod nj ;
}
i := t1;
}
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This algorithm returns i = jmd.
4. Extract message m = jmd ∗ (jd)−1.
You can compare step 3 of this algorithm with Equation 9, since this is the same thing
written out in pseudocode. You can trace through the code and see how to first calculate
i1, then continue looping until one finds ij. Any reasonable value of s will work but one
can see how much extra processing is added every time s is incremented by one.
For the following example I tried to use the same values for the key as the Paillier
example above. I was then going to use the same keys to encrypt a much bigger message,
even with s = 2. Unfortunately, I found out quickly that using n2 creates a rather large
exponent that can not be calculated easily. This forced me to use smaller values in the
keys. Even with a much smaller modulus n, I was able to encrypt a much larger message.
You can see in this example, the variables p, q are even smaller than in the previous
examples. The calculations get large quickly and the decryption algorithm takes a good
amount of work to compute. In order to keep the example at a reasonable length, it was
necessary to use numbers this artificially small. It should still serve as a good example to
show how the scheme works. This may also give us a hint as to the performance of the
Damg˚ard-Jurik algorithm when implemented.
Key Generation Example
1. p = 7, q = 5.
2. n = 35.
3. g = (n + 1) = 36. (where j, x = 1).
4. d = 9 mod 35 and d = 0 mod λ.
Using Chinese Remaindering we get d = 324 mod nλ.
5. We have the public key (35, 36). The private key is (324, 1).
Encryption Example
1. Choose s = 2 to fit our message.
2. Let plaintext m = 1000 where 1000 < 1225.
3. Let the ciphertext c = 351000231225 = 17943 mod 42875.
Decryption Example
1. The ciphertext 17943 < 42875.
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2. r = 23 ∈ Z∗n.
3. Calculate cd = 17943324 = 33251 mod 42875.
4. Calculate jmd with the following algorithm. We know j = 1 so we can disregard it.
We also know s = 2 and n = 35.
Let a = (1 + n)md = 33251 mod n3.
i := 0;
for j := 1 to 2
{
t1 := L(33251 mod 1225) = 5;
t2 := 0;
for k := 2 to 1
{
- -
}
i := 5;
for j := 2 to 2
{
t1 := L(33251 mod 42875) = 950;
t2 := 5;
for k := 2 to 2
{
i := 4;
t2 := 5 ∗ 4 mod 1225 = 20;
t1 := 950−
20∗351
2!
mod 1225 = 600;
}
i := 600;
}
This algorithm shows that i = jmd = 600.
5. To extract the message m we need (jd)−1 mod ns. Since j = 1 just calculate d−1 mod
1225 = 949, using the Extended Euclidean algorithm.
Now extract m = jmd ∗ (jd)−1 = 600 ∗ 949 mod 1225 = 1000.
8.3 Summary of Scheme
The appeal of the Damg˚ard-Jurik scheme is much the same as Paillier’s scheme. It seems
most people interested in Paillier are also interested in Damg˚ard-Jurik, since it contains
the same homomorphic property. It is being considered with Paillier for different types
of applications, where the homomorphic properties can be exploited. The scheme is also
34
relatively new, first being published in 2000. The research appears ongoing and I have
also seen Damg˚ard-Jurik’s scheme used in similar protocols for electronic voting [5] and
Private Information Retrieval [9]. Often they are testing the protocols against one another
to see which performs better. Because of all this research, there is a possibility we could
see real world applications using it in the near future.
The efficiency of Damg˚ard-Jurik is something we will investigate later on. We can
tell the expansion of the ciphertext will be smaller than Paillier with larger values of s.
The expansion can be calculated as s+1
s
, so when s = 1 we have an expansion of 2. The
expansion is reduced to 1.5 when s = 2 and it will continue to decrease the larger s
becomes. You can get the expansion factor very close to 1, but this can take very large
values of s. It is unlikely that large values of s will be practical from the computational
aspect.
As with Paillier, I have found no claims of people cracking the scheme. Since the
schemes are based on the same principles, I believe their security is similar. It should
be noted that by enlarging s we can increase the size of the plaintext without increasing
security by enlarging n. Users should keep in mind the value of n for security purposes
and avoid using a large value of s to keep the value of n too small. The value of n should
always be large enough that it hasn’t yet been factored.
Finally, I do believe that the Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem has some great potential
for the same reason as Paillier’s. Since they both have the same homomorphic property,
there is a good chance only one will succeed. It may come down to which scheme can be
implemented faster. You have seen Damg˚ard-Jurik is much more complicated, but if it
improves performance, it will be worth it. There is also a chance that this could degrade
performance and doom the scheme. I will give my conclusion on which performs better
in the ”Testing Results and Recommendations” section.
9 Design of Cryptography Software
This section gives an overview of the program that I created to test and compare the
Paillier and Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystems with RSA. I will explain how the schemes were
implemented and any assumptions I used. The explanations will review any techniques I
used to speed up each implementation.
The first subsection will give a brief description of the Java Cryptography Extension
and how I used it. The next subsection will describe the front end application that is
used to manage, send, and receive encrypted messages. The following four subsections will
go over the different implementations I used for each scheme. These subsections cover
the schemes RSA, Paillier, Damg˚ard-Jurik, and Second Paillier. The Second Paillier
subsection describes a version of Paillier that uses a different decryption technique but
can still be called the Paillier scheme.
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9.1 Using Java Cryptography Extension
To make my Message Communicating program and my Cryptography schemes indepen-
dent and flexible, I used the Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) as the framework for
my software. The JCE contains a framework for building cryptography schemes and tools
(see [8], [17]). Some of the schemes and tools are already implemented and ready for use,
but one can also create their own. This allowed me to create my own encryption software,
while also using an established implementation from a Provider to do my testing. The
Provider is some type of group that provides a jar file with cryptography tools built in
the JCE. The Classes in the Provider’s jar file can be used by putting a reference to it
in the java.security file or by referencing it in the code. Doing this allows one to create
instances of these cryptography tools by using the specific name given to each.
For my work I used a Provider for one of the schemes and created my own Provider
for the other three schemes. Because all the schemes are implemented using the JCE, it
was easy to grab different instances of each scheme. The code needed little specialization
to deal with the differences between schemes.
Generally speaking, a person cannot just create his own Provider. Sun specifically
tells us that we must be a specialized software company to obtain a special certificate.
This certificate allows one to create a jar file as a Provider that contains tools built in
the JCE. Without the certificate one can compile you code, but anything derived from
the JCE classes will error when run. This policy doesn’t make sense to me but it seems
they are loosening it. After initially denying my request, they later gave me the certificate
I needed. I would imagine they will do the same for others interested in implementing
cryptography in the JCE but I don’t know this for sure. If you can’t get this certificate
you can access tools from the JCE created by other Providers, but you will not be able
to create your own.
9.2 Message Communication Program
The Message Communication program is designed to be a peer-to-peer application that
allows us to send encrypted messages across a network. It was built using the JCE API
and RMI technology in Java. The program was designed so only two sessions could be
running and communicate at once. It was created so that we could plug in about any
working public key encryption scheme with very little effort. The users should see little
difference between encryption types when the file gets passed if the schemes are working
correctly. The big exception is the amount of time to encrypt and decrypt the file, as will
be seen in the results of my experiments.
The Message Communication program is designed so the message receiver session
initiates the communication with the message sender session. If this were a productional
application it would need some type of authentication, but we skip this step since it is
only designed for academic use. The message receiver selects the type of cryptography
and any parameters needed to set up the scheme. Once it has this information, it creates
the public and private keys and sends the public key to the sender along with the type
of cryptography being used. The private key will only reside on the receiver, ensuring no
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one has a chance to obtain the decryption information. Once the type of cryptography is
decided and the keys are initialized, there is no way to change these values in the receiving
session. If the sending session receives a new cryptography scheme and key, it will encrypt
according to these new values.
The receiver decides the directory and filename of the file that will be sent, along
with the directory and filename where the file will reside on itself (the receiver). The
information about the file to be sent is relayed to the sending session. Once it receives
the information, it imports the file and encrypts it in chunks. The chunks are as big as
possible while still allowing the entire chunk to be encrypted in one encryption. The size
of the chunks is generally dependent on the size of the modulus chosen, since the plaintext
can’t be bigger than the modulus. Chunks of the plaintext are converted to byte arrays
and sent to the cipher to be encrypted, with the cipher returning the ciphertext also as a
byte array. The chunks of ciphertext are placed in an array of byte arrays, where there is
one byte array for each chunk that was encrypted. The array of byte arrays is then sent
to the receiver session to be decrypted.
The receiver gets the array of byte arrays with the length of the array. The decryption
occurs in chunks, as each byte array is passed to the decryption cipher. Each block of
decrypted ciphertext is concatenated to the previous blocks to recreate the final plaintext.
Once the entire ciphertext is decrypted the plaintext is output to the file and directory
specified earlier. You can view a simple diagram of the process flow in Figure 1 below.
To keep track of the amount of time used, I set both operations up to get the time
stamp in milliseconds before and after the encryption and decryption. The time includes
the initialization of the cipher along with operations performed on each chunk. It does
not include the setup of the Message Sender, initialization of the keys, or the file transfer.
The total time needed to perform these operations is displayed for both encryption and
decryption.
Receiving Session Sending Session
Receive public key,
file information,
encryption type.
Send encrypted
message.
Send public key,
file information,
encryption type.
Receive encrypted
message, decrypt.
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Figure 1. Message Passing Program.
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9.3 RSA Implementation
The RSA implementation was taken from a Provider known as Cryptix. This organization
has a large number of cryptography schemes implemented through the JCE, available on
its website www.Cryptix.org. You can also get the source code for all their code, which
is very helpful. It does not appear there has been much work with the Provider recently,
but I found what is currently there works well.
The implementation is done using PKCS1 RSA Cryptography Standard v1.5 as noted
on www.rsasecurity.com. This version of RSA uses padding at the beginning of encryp-
tion chunk. The padding decreases the amount of text that can be encrypted by 12 bytes,
which is a small disadvantage for this scheme. The padding contains a pseudorandom
string that makes the encrypted string different, even when encrypting the same value.
This is one of the characteristics of a probabilistic scheme that is incorporated into a
deterministic scheme.
The scheme is implemented using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) to increase
the speed of decryption. Using the CRT in RSA has mostly become a standard , since it
is relatively easy to do and can increase decryption speed up to 4 times. We are also able
to use CRT in other schemes and achieve similar results as will be seen later. You can
view an explanation on how CRT is used in public key cryptography in Appendix B.
9.4 Paillier Implementation
The first Paillier implementation is generally taken straight from [14]. The encryption and
decryption algorithms I used were taken from section 4 of his paper and were outlined
earlier in section 6.2. I did use the suggestions in section 7 to increase efficiency [14].
One very helpful suggestion is to use Chinese Remainder Theorem for decryption. To
do this, perform the operations mod p and mod q and then bring them together mod n
when finished. Paillier describes this in detail in this section and one can read about the
general advantages of the CRT approach in Appendix B.
The other ways I increase performance include choosing specific values or precomput-
ing values in key generation or the initialization of the scheme. These steps only run once
at the beginning, so the values are only calculated once instead of every time a chunk
is encrypted or decrypted. All the values in both keys are precomputed, as well as the
following ways I increased performance.
1. Precompute the value rn only once in initialization for each message passed. This
may not be possible for all protocols since a different r may be needed to increase
security. If two chunks of the same message were exactly the same, then the ci-
phertext would be the same. This would be a rare situation when passing normal
messages. It would be interesting to study if keeping the value of r allows for any
easy way to crack the ciphertext.
2. Set g = (1 + n). This is the simplest value and there seems to be no benefit of
calculating something more complicated.
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3. Precompute n2, which is p2 and q2 when using CRT.
4. Precompute L(gλ mod n2)−1 mod n which needs to be L(gλ mod p2)−1 mod p and
L(gλ mod q2)−1 mod q when using CRT.
In my explanation on Paillier, I pointed out that calculating L(gλ mod n2)−1 mod n
is unnecessary since you are just finding the value λ. Using the CRT I could only get
decryption to work using this value when calculating mod p and mod q. This is the only
way I found it works, although I may have been doing something wrong. I assume there
is a good explanation for this but I didn’t research it further because it doesn’t affect the
timings much. The value is quickly precomputed only once either way, so the timings are
virtually the same.
9.5 Damg˚ard-Jurik Implementation
For Damg˚ard-Jurik, I used the Ph.D. thesis of Jurik [7] as the main source for my algo-
rithms. I used the encryption scheme described in section 2.2. I was also able to use some
of the suggestions from section 2.3.2.to optimize my calculations, the biggest of which was
using the CRT.
The explanation on how to use the CRT is quite brief and not complete. A lot of the
calculations are similar to Paillier’s use of the CRT, but there are a few differences that
aren’t intuitive. I actually became very frustrated trying to implement this due to the
missing information, so I e-mailed Jurik for an more detail. I will give a full description
of the algorithm we discussed, since I don’t believe it is available anywhere else. These
are the steps needed to use the CRT for Damg˚ard-Jurik.
1. First we can reduce the ciphertext ciph size by evaluating it with each modulus:
ciphp = ciph mod p
s+1 and ciphq = ciph mod q
s+1.
2. Then we remove the random part by calculating dp = ciph
p−1
p mod p
s+1 and dq =
ciphq−1q mod q
s+1.
3. Now we need to find the discrete log by using the dLog(a) function described. The
function is slightly different than before since we must perform it modulus p and q.
The L function is different for each value: Lp(a) = (
a−1 mod ps+1
p
)∗q−1 mod ps = mes′p
and Lq(a) = (
a−1 mod qs+1
q
) ∗ p−1 mod qs = mes′q (these are described in the paper).
With the new L functions one can compute dLog(a) for each value dp and dq and
replacing the modulus n with p or q respectively. However, you do not replace n
when computing nk−1, which was the stumbling block I had. These calculations
give us mes′p and mes
′
q.
4. Now that we used the discrete log function to retrieve the exponent, we can remove
(p− 1) and (q − 1) added to the exponent earlier. We do this with mesp = mes
′
p ∗
(p − 1)−1 mod ps and mesq = mes
′
q ∗ (q − 1)
−1 mod qs. This gives us the message
in both moduli, ps and ps.
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5. The final step is using Chinese Remaindering to take our two values and create the
congruent value modulus n. We will call the function CRT(mesp, p
s, mesq, q
s) =
mesn. This is the message in modulus n, the answer we are looking for.
The other ways I increased performance are similar to Paillier, by choosing specific
values or precomputing values in key generation or the initialization of the scheme. Both
run once at the beginning, so these values are only calculated once, instead of every time
a chunk is encrypted or decrypted. All the values in both keys are precomputed and the
following methods to increase performance as well.
1. Precompute the value rn
s
only once in the initialization for each message passed.
The argument for or against this is the same as for Paillier. It may not work well
in all situations but seems to work well for normal message passing. It definitely
speeds up encryption by only calculating once.
2. Choose value g = (1 + n). Even though Damg˚ard-Jurik describes a much more
complicated g = (1 + n)jx mod ns+1, they still admit there is no reason to use this
more complicated version.
3. Choose value d = λ. I didn’t find any reason for using any other higher value and
λ is the simplest.
4. Precompute ns, which is ps and qs when using CRT. Also precalculate ns+1, which
is ps+1 and qs+1 using the CRT.
5. Precompute the value (jd)−1 mod ns (jd = λ) used to remove jd after we calculate
the exponent. When using CRT this is (p− 1)−1 mod ps and (q − 1)−1 mod qs
6. There are several values in the L function that can be precomputed and passed in.
The first is nj where 1 ≤ j ≤ (s + 1), which is pj and qj where 1 ≤ j ≤ (s + 1)
when using the CRT. You will still need nj as well when using CRT. All these
values will need to be created in arrays to access them easily. The other key value is
(k!)−1 mod nj where 2 ≤ k ≤ s and 1 ≤ j ≤ s. This will require a two-dimensional
array to store. I found that one does not need to calculate (k!) for pj and qj since
it is later evaluated with those moduli and precomputing mod nj worked fine.
7. When using the CRT, there are some special values that can be precomputed for
the L function. These are p−1 mod qs and q−1 mod ps. These are not needed when
not using CRT.
8. In the discrete log function, one can precompute the value L(a mod ns+1) before
entering the loop. You can then evaluate this mod nj each iteration, which is the
same as evaluating L(a mod nj+1) each time. Of course, when using CRT, one can
change out modulus n with either p or q and do the same calculations. This also
works with the special L function mentioned above for CRT calculations.
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All these optimizations do add some complexity to the algorithms but I believe they
are worth it. I recommend when implementing your own version of Damg˚ard-Jurik to
first get your code working without CRT, then change it to use CRT. You can also view
my source code for any specific questions on what I did. I commented out all the code
I used originally before implementing CRT algorithms, so one can still see what worked
without the CRT. The final code uses the CRT, so one can also see how that was done.
9.6 Second Paillier Implementation
I found the Second Paillier method in several places, but there was no official source of
where it originated. The best reference for it is [1]. Since the encryption is exactly the
same as the original Paillier, I used the same logic for encrypting. Decryption is a little
different and so the optimizations are different too.
I used CRT again but it is less effective here because of other optimizations one can see.
Again, I did some precomputing of values and chose specific values to increase efficiency.
All this was done in the key generation or initialization, once per message. The following
is a list of these optimizations.
1. Precompute the value rn only once in the initialization for each message passed.
This may still be a problem the same way it was for the Original Paillier scheme,
but it helps efficiency much more using this algorithm. This helps in encryption by
only calculating rn once but you will see later it can also help in decryption.
2. Choose value g = (1 + n). This is the simplest value and there seems to be no
benefit of calculating something more complicated.
3. Precalculate the value α. When using the CRT one needs αp = n
−1 mod (p− 1)
and αq = n
−1 mod (q − 1).
4. When doing decryption, only calculate r−n once per message. Since this value does
not change, this can be exploited in my algorithm. Because this is the major part
of decryption, the operation is much quicker.
5. Precompute n2, which is p2 and q2 when using CRT.
6. When using the CRT there are some special values that can be precomputed for the
L function, as there were for Damg˚ard-Jurik. These are p−1 mod q2 and q−1 mod p2.
These are not needed when not using CRT.
The method for using the CRT is similar to what we have already seen before.
1. The first step is to find αp = n
−1 mod (p− 1) and αq = n
−1 mod (q − 1).
2. Then use ciphertext c to find dp = c
αp mod p2 and dq = c
αq mod q2.
3. Next we use the modified L function to calculate Lp(a) = ((a − 1 mod p
2)/p) ∗
q−1 mod p = mp and Lq(a) = ((a− 1 mod q
2)/q) ∗ p−1 mod q = mq.
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4. Finally, we can find the congruence mod n by doing the function CRT(mp, p,mq, q)
to give us our decrypted message.
Unlike the other two schemes I used the CRT for, I don’t know if it helped the Second
Paillier scheme. Even so, it does not make decryption slower and it was interesting to see
it worked, yet without much improvement.
10 Test Results and Recommendations
In this section, I will outline all the tests I did on each cryptosystem I implemented, while
giving my observations. I will also list all of the timings I recorded from running each
scheme with different parameters. I will conclude with my final recommendations.
The tests I performed were basically the same on each scheme. I created 5 files called
file1.txt - file5.txt, each one bigger than the last. The sizes are: 1024, 2048, 4096, 8192,
and 16384 bytes. I performed encryption on each of these files with different size keys.
The size of the keys were: 1024, 2048, and 4096 bits. I tried using bigger keys and
bigger files, but the timings took too long and data was not showing anything significant.
The timings should show how each scheme performs with different size keys on different
amounts of data.
One thing I wanted to note before I move into the tests is that I didn’t take into
account the time to set up the keys. For the smaller key sizes this did not matter much,
as the keys were generated in a matter of a few seconds. For keys 4096 bits and larger, the
key generation took minutes and the larger key increased time exponentially. This would
seem impractical to me in the real world, but it did not get noted in my other tests.
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10.1 RSA Scheme Results and Observations
Time in milliseconds, E = Encryption, D = Decryption, C = Chunks
RSA 1024 2048 4096
File1.txt - 1k E - 15 E - 15 E - 47
D - 203 D - 657 D - 2578
C - 9 C - 5 C - 3
File2.txt - 2k E - 32 E - 32 E - 62
D - 312 D - 1093 D - 4594
C - 18 C - 9 C - 5
File3.txt - 4k E - 46 E - 63 E - 110
D - 625 D - 2031 D - 8094
C - 36 C - 17 C - 9
File4.txt - 8k E - 94 E - 125 E - 219
D - 1250 D - 4063 D - 15859
C - 72 C - 34 C - 17
File5.txt - 16k E - 187 E - 281 E - 468
D - 2500 D - 8969 D - 29922
C - 143 C - 68 C - 33
Table 1. RSA Timings.
As I mentioned in my description of the implementation, the Provider for RSA is
a professional organization, so I expected it to work well and perform fast. I was not
disappointed, since the RSA times were overall the fastest of all the schemes. I expected
this since the calculations for RSA are much simpler and they take less operations. It
is unlikely any of the other cryptosystems studied here will be able to surpass RSA in a
straight speed competition. So, if you are looking for a fast public key cryptosystem, I
still think RSA as the best of the bunch.
Specifically the encryption was the fastest by far, beating all others by at least 100
times. For decryption it was also fast, but not always the fastest, as it got beat by the
Second Paillier cryptosystem. The encryption was so much faster any other scheme that
RSA was always faster with its overall time.
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10.2 Paillier Scheme Results and Observations
Time in milliseconds, E = Encryption, D = Decryption, C = Chunks
Paillier 1024 2048 4096
File1.txt - 1k E - 1750 E - 6687 E - 27031
D - 563 D - 2235 D - 10421
C - 9 C - 5 C - 3
File2.txt - 2k E - 3750 E - 14562 E - 53922
D - 1078 D - 4156 D - 17031
C - 17 C - 9 C - 5
File3.txt - 4k E - 7532 E - 26938 E - 114078
D - 2016 D - 7703 D - 30453
C - 33 C - 17 C - 9
File4.txt - 8k E - 14797 E - 53406 E - 206110
D - 3938 D - 14562 D - 56782
C - 65 C - 33 C - 17
File5.txt - 16k E - 29656 E - 111719 E - 422891
D - 7860 D - 29094 D - 117765
C - 130 C - 65 C - 33
Table 2. Paillier Timings.
Paillier seemed to perform admirably against the standard RSA. It was not as fast
in either encryption or decryption, but it seems fast enough that it could be considered
for uses that RSA doesn’t work for. I think the main thing that needs to be worked
on is encryption, as it is much slower and there are very few optimizations for it. The
decryption was much closer but the Second Paillier scheme was even faster in decryption.
It seems that either this algorithm or the Second Paillier scheme could be used for an
application that needs homomorphic encryption.
Specifically, the encryption was anywhere from 100 to almost 1000 times slower de-
pending on how big the file and key became. The decryption was much better performing
at a range of 2-3 times slower when the key was smaller. The performance difference was
greater when the key got bigger, but these size keys probably aren’t practical at this time.
The CRT was a big help reducing decryption by 3 to 4 times. Without it, the decryption
times were generally higher than encryption.
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10.3 Damg˚ard-Jurik Scheme Results and Observations
Time in milliseconds, E = Encryption, D = Decryption, C = Chunks
DJ, s = 2 1024 2048 4096
File1.txt - 1k E - 3953 E - 15719 E - 58609
D - 718 D - 3079 D - 14875
C - 5 C - 3 C - 2
File2.txt - 2k E - 8141 E - 31015 E - 116328
D - 1281 D - 5156 D - 23828
C - 9 C - 5 C - 3
File3.txt - 4k E - 15750 E - 60547 E - 243469
D - 2250 D - 9188 D - 39562
C - 17 C - 9 C - 5
File4.txt - 8k E - 31969 E - 120297 E - 461391
D - 4797 D - 17141 D - 66219
C - 33 C - 17 C - 9
File5.txt - 16k E - 63235 E - 241000 E - 901516
D - 8782 D - 33141 D - 125000
C - 65 C - 33 C - 17
Table 3. Damg˚ard-Jurik Timings, s = 2.
Time in milliseconds, E = Encryption, D = Decryption, C = Chunks
DJ, s = 3 1024 2048 4096
File1.txt - 1k E - 6703 E - 28390 E - 103516
D - 703 D - 3422 D - 13547
C - 3 C - 2 C - 1
File2.txt - 2k E - 13390 E - 54360 E - 201109
D - 1437 D - 5609 D - 26875
C - 6 C - 3 C - 2
File3.txt - 4k E - 26766 E - 111141 E - 424703
D - 2641 D - 11312 D - 41906
C - 11 C - 6 C - 3
File4.txt - 8k E - 53641 E - 218953 E - 816641
D - 5312 D - 19344 D - 80672
C - 22 C - 11 C - 6
File5.txt - 16k E - 106656 E - 411515 E - 1598079
D - 9875 D - 38281 D - 147484
C - 43 C - 22 C - 11
Table 4. Damg˚ard-Jurik Timings, s = 3.
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Time in milliseconds, E = Encryption, D = Decryption, C = Chunks
DJ, s = 4 1024 2048 4096
File1.txt - 1k E - 10812 E - 40172 E - 171125
D - 1188 D - 6000 D - 21860
C - 3 C - 2 C - 1
File2.txt - 2k E - 21781 E - 82282 E - 337578
D - 1859 D - 8250 D - 44531
C - 5 C - 3 C - 2
File3.txt - 4k E - 45219 E - 169625 E - 638875
D - 3578 D - 14282 D - 65468
C - 9 C - 5 C - 3
File4.txt - 8k E - 88094 E - 343781 E - 1362546
D - 6515 D - 26781 D - 118469
C - 17 C - 9 C - 5
File5.txt - 16k E - 179968 E - 665875 E - 2672078
D - 12203 D - 48438 D - 206672
C - 33 C - 17 C - 9
Table 5. Damg˚ard-Jurik Timings, s = 4.
For Damg˚ard-Jurik I did 3 sets of tests to see results for bigger values of s. I did
tests with s = 2, 3, 4 but did not do s = 1 since this is Paillier’s scheme. I did not do
any tests above s = 4 because it seems clear that the higher values of s do not help the
system perform better. The idea that one could adjust s to encrypt any size value in
one chunk is good in theory, but I found it to be slower in my testing. In some cases
Damg˚ard-Jurik algorithm was close to Paillier, but overall it was significantly slower. It
seems that doubling, tripling, or more, the size of the exponent, makes the calculation
too slow to make up for the extra values encrypted. I would recommend using Paillier
over Damg˚ard-Jurik, since it is slower and has no advantages over Paillier.
Specifically, Damg˚ard-Jurik was about 2 times slower in encryption but only mar-
ginally slower in decryption when s = 2. Of course, each time s increased, the encryption
time was twice as slow. Decryption again was only marginally slower as s increased, but
these problems seem too hard to overcome and make the scheme outperform Paillier. I
believe the scheme would need to outperform Paillier to find a practical use.
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10.4 Second Paillier Scheme Results and Observations
Time in milliseconds, E = Encryption, D = Decryption, C = Chunks
Second Paillier 1024 2048 4096
File1.txt - 1k E - 1797 E - 6891 E - 25641
D - 156 D - 1000 D - 7781
C - 9 C - 5 C - 3
File2.txt - 2k E - 3860 E - 13781 E - 51813
D - 172 D - 1000 D - 7547
C - 17 C - 9 C - 5
File3.txt - 4k E - 7657 E - 27844 E - 103515
D - 172 D - 1047 D - 7688
C - 33 C - 17 C - 9
File4.txt - 8k E - 13922 E - 54734 E - 206828
D - 203 D - 1125 D - 7906
C - 65 C - 33 C - 17
File5.txt - 16k E - 27719 E - 108343 E - 413000
D - 250 D - 1172 D - 8360
C - 130 C - 65 C - 33
Table 2. Second Paillier Timings.
This second version of Paillier was the fastest performing of all the schemes I studied.
It wasn’t as fast as RSA overall, but did have some great times for decryption. It was
always faster than RSA for decryption and got comparably faster the greater the size of
the private key. The encryption performed was the same as the original Paillier scheme,
since it is exactly the same algorithm, at anywhere from 100 to 1000 times slower than
RSA. If some way is found to increase encryption time, I think it will compete close to the
speed of RSA, especially for larger data sizes. Overall, RSA was still much faster because
of encryption but I would recommend using Second Paillier for probabilistic homomorphic
encryption scheme since the encryption is fastest.
Interestingly, the decryption for this scheme was only slightly slower as the file size
got much bigger. For this reason the decryption was much faster for bigger keys and files
than any other scheme. Since encryption is the same as the Original Paillier system, any
improvement in the original encryption will also speed up this scheme.
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10.5 Comparative Graphs
48
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From the six graphs above one can compare the timings I found for both encryption
and decryption for three different key sizes. It should be easy to compare the results and
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see the patterns that emerge. I did not graph Damg˚ard-Jurik for s = 3 and 4 because the
s = 2 was always the fastest and I didn’t feel the graph would add much.
From all the graphs it is easy to see that RSA is always the quickest or near the
quickest. Paillier is always a little quicker than Damg˚ard-Jurik for both encryption and
decryption. The Later Paillier scheme is virtually the same as the Original Paillier scheme
for encryption because they use the same algorithm. For decryption the Later Paillier
method is faster than any other scheme. The most important graphs are encryption and
decryption where the key is 1024 bits, since this is the most common keysize at this time.
10.6 Final Recommendations
This concludes my results. My final recommendation for a probabilistic homomorphic
cryptosystem is to use the Paillier system with the second method of decryption. It is the
fastest for encryption and decryption and has all the same benefits. The security seems
as good as any of the schemes, so there is no reason to go with another. Certainly, all
these schemes are fairly new, so there could be another variation in the works that could
trump all of these. It will be interesting to see where the study of these cryptosystems
goes in the next few years.
I believe my idea to reuse the same random value r should work without making it
less secure. As I mentioned before, it would only be a problem if several chunks of the
message were exactly the same. This should not happen often and it could be overcome
by sending the chunks in different messages. I am curious to see if anyone finds a security
flaw with using this r in the implementation. If it is found unpractical to use this value,
it would greatly change the results of my tests. It would increase the encryption time
significantly and also greatly increase the decryption time of the Second Paillier scheme.
Of course, the test would need to be rerun to get the exact numbers.
As for the private key size, the recommendation on RSA Laboratories is 1024 bits for
today. This works faster than the larger keys and has not yet been factored effectively.
Doubling the length of the private key generally increases the encryption and decryption
time by 4 times, even though the encryption chunks are twice as large. Of course, the
security is increased much more than this, but it doesn’t seem necessary at this time. The
exception to this is RSA encryption that only increases time by about 2 times.
The different file sizes generally increase encryption time at a very steady rate. When
the file size doubles it takes twice as long to encrypt the file with twice as many chunks
for the same size key, which shouldn’t surprise anyone. The big exception to this was the
Second Paillier scheme which only had a nominal increase in time when the file doubled
in size. In fact the decryption time did not even double with a file 16 times bigger. The
increase in time was very linear and was similar when the key size doubled or quadrupled.
This is obviously because computing r, the most complicated calculation, is only needed
once, no matter how long the data is.
I think my results show that RSA will never be surpassed by one of these probabilistic
schemes as far as speed and security are concerned. RSA has been tested for over 30
years and has proven to be a secure and reliable system, whereas these schemes are still
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very young and I don’t believe they are proven completely secure yet. RSA will most
likely always be intrinsically faster than the schemes I studied. Fortunately probabilistic,
homomorphic schemes shouldn’t need to directly compete with RSA to be useful. Their
uses will be specific to their unique properties.
So, after all my research , do I think these cryptosystems have a chance to be practically
used in the future? I definitely think they have great potential in the future and may
even be used right now. The additively homomorphic properties have a lot of practical
uses that are being studied. It will just be a matter of time before these are used in a real
world application. If the encryption time can be increased, then there will be even more
interest and uses for this type of cryptography. I am very excited to see what applications
that use these cryptosystems will emerge over the next few years.
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A Homomorphic Encryption
Both the Paillier and Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystems have several homomorphic properties
that are very useful. These properties are: addition of multiple ciphertexts, the addition
of a plaintext constant to a ciphertext, and the multiplication of plaintext constant by a
ciphertext [1]. We will explain the mathematics behind each of these. You will need to
understand the mathematics of how each cryptosystem works to understand this appendix.
A.1 Addition of Multiple Ciphertexts
For Paillier’s scheme, I will show how to take two messages m1 and m2, first encrypt them
with different random values r1 and r2, then multiply them together, and finally see the
result is additively homomorphic.
Eg(m1, r1) = g
m1 ∗ rn1 mod n
2
Eg(m2, r2) = g
m2 ∗ rn2 mod n
2
Eg(m1, r1) ∗ Eg(m2, r2) = (g
m1 ∗ rn1 )(g
m2 ∗ rn2 ) mod n
2
= gm1+m2(r1 ∗ r2)
n mod n2
= Eg(m1 + m2, r1 ∗ r2)
You can see above that when the exponents of g are combined together with the same
g they exponents are added together. This shows how multiplication of the ciphertexts
is equivalent to adding the plaintexts. We know that both random values belong to Z∗n,
so this implies r1 ∗ r2 ∈ Z
∗
n (see 2.125 in [10]). Although the random value changed, it
will still disappear with the exponent λ because it is still in Z∗n. This will leave us with
gm1+m2 which can be solved the same as before. This shows us how the homomorphic
addition works.
The mathematics to show additive homomorphism for Damg˚ard-Jurik are similar.
Eg(m1, r1) = g
m1 ∗ rn
s
1 mod n
s+1
Eg(m2, r2) = g
m2 ∗ rn
s
2 mod n
s+1
Eg(m1, r1) ∗ Eg(m2, r2) = (g
m1jxm1 ∗ rn
s
1 )(g
m2jxm2 ∗ rn
s
2 ) mod n
s+1
= (g(m1+m2)j(xm1m2)(r1 ∗ r2)
ns mod ns+1
= Eg(m1 + m2, r1 ∗ r2)
Virtually the same thing happens here as did in Paillier for the values r and m. The
extra value x ∈ Z∗n will now become x
m1m2 when doing homomorphic addition. This is
still no problem in decryption because the exponent of x doesn’t matter. The decryption
still evaluates xcλ = 1, where c is any positive integer coefficient. The exponent can be
anything that is a multiple of λ. This shows that Damg˚ard-Jurik’s scheme is additively
homomorphic, the same as Paillier’s.
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A.2 Addition of Plaintext Constants to Ciphertext
We show how to add a constant c to an encrypted value and that it is like adding the
constant to the ciphertext before encryption. The process for Paillier follows.
Eg(m, r) ∗ g
c = gm ∗ rn ∗ gc mod n2
= g(m+c) ∗ rn mod n2
= Eg(m + c, r)
In Paillier, the multiplication to a power c with the base g is the same as addition.
Because of the characteristics of grouping exponents of the same base g, c gets added to
m. The value m + c is then retrieved in decryption.
Again, Damg˚ard-Jurik is very similar and the explanation is basically the same.
Eg(m, r) ∗ g
c = gm ∗ rn
s
∗ gc mod ns+1
= g(m+c) ∗ rn
s
mod ns+1
= Eg(m + c, r)
A.3 Multiplication of Plaintext Constants by Ciphertext
Finally, we show that we can multiply a constant c by an encrypted value and it is the
same as multiplying the constant by the ciphertext before encryption. The process for
Paillier follows.
Eg(m, r)
c = (gm ∗ rn)c mod n2
= g(m∗c) ∗ r(n∗c) mod n2
= Eg(m ∗ c, r
c)
In the Paillier scheme, if you take the ciphertext to a power c this is the same as
multiplying m ∗ c. Because of the characteristics of grouping exponents the exponent c is
multiplied by each of the current exponents in Eg. The value r
c will still disappear since
it will be in Z∗n. This works because r ∈ Z
∗
n and any two values r1 ∗ r2 will always stay
in Z∗n (see 2.125 in [10]). This leaves us with the exponent of g as m ∗ c, which can be
extracted in decryption.
The mathematics and explanation for Damg˚ard-Jurik will also be very similar.
Eg(m, r)
c = (gm ∗ rn
s
)c mod ns+1
= g(m∗c) ∗ r(n
s
∗c) mod ns+1
= Eg(m ∗ c, r
c)
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B Chinese Remainder Theorem in Public Key De-
cryption
The Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) is given as follows in [16].
Theorem 2 Suppose gcd(m,n) = 1. Given a and b, there exists exactly one solution
x mod mn to the simultaneous congruences
x ≡ a mod m, x ≡ b mod n.
The CRT can be very useful in our schemes because our modulus n = pq and p and
q are prime. Therefore, it is possible to perform two separate decryption operations on
a ciphertext, one mod p and one mod q. We can then use the CRT to find an answer to
both of these decryptions mod n. This answer is the same as if we had just performed
one operation mod n.
When I first saw this technique used to calculate the decryption, I was skeptical that it
would improve performance much. In order to use the CRT, one must perform encryption
twice and then use the CRT to get the final answer in modulus n. After implementing the
changes and looking at the difference in the operations, I realized that I was very wrong.
The reason why this approach is so effective is that we are able to use the the exponents
p− 1 and q − 1. In RSA and Paillier the exponent is φ = (p− 1)(q − 1) or λ = (p−1)(q−1)
2
respectively. This means that the exponent used with the CRT is roughly the square root
of what is used without the CRT. A small example of this is when p = 97, q = 103, and
n = 9991. If we have a base b, then can either calculate b96 mod 97 and b100 mod 101
or b9792 mod 9991. You can see it is much quicker to evaluate the 2 statements that use
the factors of n instead of the one statement because the exponents are so much smaller.
In real world examples where the modulus n is 1024 bits, the difference is even more
apparent. Of course, one could use modular exponentiation to calculate these quicker,
but even so it is about 8 times faster to calculate with a factor p than with n. Since
we have two of these calculations with the CRT, we get 4 a times improvement. The
convergence of the two numbers to mod n is generally negligible in time, so one can
expect up to a 4 times increase in speed. There are other operations going on, so one
can expect 4 to be an upper bound for time improvement. But even with everything else,
I never had an improvement less than 2 times and it was generally over 3 times better.
Using the CRT is definitely worth the effort if possible when doing decryption.
So the question may arise, “Can we use the CRT for encryption?” It seems possible
with knowledge of p and q but that is precisely the problem. We can’t share p or q with
the person encrypting, since these values are our private key. If we share them this is
no longer a public key scheme and we lose the main concept of what we are doing. It
seems very unlikely some type of operation using the CRT without knowledge of p or q is
possible, so we will say this idea is not plausible.
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